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Pay attention! Exploring Contemplative Pedagogies between Eckhart and 
Heidegger 1 
David Lewin, University of Strathclyde 
 
Attention is a mysterious faculty. It seems to knit together experiences, attitudes, histories, 
skills, dispositions, intuitions and manifold other aspects of lived experience such that 
discussions of it cut across a range of domains, from, for example, cognitive neuroscience and 
educational theory to ancient philosophies of Vedanta and Buddhism. Taking its cue from the 
title of the volume, this chapter examines attention by drawing together strands from mystical 
theology, particularly Meister Eckhart, and continental philosophy, that of Martin Heidegger. 
The argument will explore some difficulties of conceiving attention as a faculty of human 
agency. While these considerations will be, I hope, of general philosophical interest, I will 
apply them to concrete contexts of educational theory and practice. Educational contexts 
illustrate well the ways in which attention is both conceived and misconceived, as well as 
providing a strong practical motivation for needing to consider the extent to which attention 
can be managed and controlled, and the anthropological suppositions present in such 
considerations. The argument relies upon mystical theology insofar as it draws on negative 
strategies for undoing some of the conventional ways of framing attention. This is the kind of 
theological framing that the post-metaphysical Heidegger might wish to develop. I begin with 
                                                          
1 7KLVFKDSWHULVEDVHGRQP\DUWLFOHµ%HKROG6LOHQFHDQG$WWHQWLRQLQ(GXFDWLRQ¶Journal of Philosophy of 
Education, 48:3, 2014, and I am grateful to John Wiley and Sons for permission to reproduce parts of that 
article. The argument is similar in places, though in this chapter the emphasis on Heidegger and Eckhart is 
drawn out and developed in greater detail, and the context in educational philosophy is less developed. 
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the primary moment in which education is enacted: the moment in which student, teacher, and 
world are gathered. 
 
Behold: this may be the HGXFDWRU¶V essential word. Whatever else teachers do, they draw the 
attention of students to things. As in the Platonic allegory, the teacher drags the student from 
the cave of ignorance and, standing in the light of truth, gestures or speaks the essential word. 
To say behold recognises the autonomy of the student in the apprehension of being, and the 
agency of the world in the presence of things. It is to show more than to speak, to address being 
more than knowing. The teacher is not the source of the light, nor does she enforce its 
apprehension, even if she can support its comprehension. 
 
Although an archaic sounding word, behold is still used in a way that denotes giving regard or 
attention to something, holding it in view. It can also connote being caught by something as 
though beheld by it. More often where we come across the word these days it can sound 
ornamental, rhetorical, or comical. But this impression is mistaken. Behold is related to the 
German halten to hold, originally meaning to keep, watch over, hold firmly or restrain. It calls 
us to attend, but also holds or restrains that attention. Maggie Ross calls it WKH³most important 
word in the Bible,´2 where the chronicles of Scripture begin and end. As the translation of the 
Hebrew hinneh, it is the first word God says to Adam and Eve after creating and blessing them: 
µBehold, I have given you every herb bearing seed, which is upon the face of all the earth, and 
every tree, in the which is the fruit of a tree yielding seHGWR\RXLWVKDOOEHIRUPHDW¶3 The 
Greek word Idou, also often translated as behold, is the last word that the risen Christ speaks 
                                                          
2 Maggie Ross, µ%HKROG1RWWKH&ORXGRI([SHULHQFH¶LQ($-RQHVHGThe Medieval Mystical Tradition 
VIII, (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer 2013), p. 30. 
3 Genesis 1: 29. All Biblical quotations are taken from the King James Bible. 
 3 
to his disciples: µ«EHKROG,DPZLWK\RXDOZD\VHYHQXQWRWKHHQGRIWKHZRUOG$PHQ.¶4 
Other Biblical terms also have similar resonance and perform similar rolesµOR¶µ\HD¶µVHH¶
DQGµVXGGHQO\¶ It is the performative capacity of language that places mystical language at 
some distance from propositional or doctrinal discourse. In other words, language has the 
capacity here to disclose or reveal, not simply to point out. 
 
To behold places one firmly in the present. It is often understood as a moment both temporally 
and ontologically prior to interpretation, explication, or analysis. It speaks at the point of world-
disclosure: it can be said to speak the world. ,WLVDV5RVVSXWVLW³a liminal word; it signals the 
threshold of contemplation, where the self-conscious mind stops analysing and becomes 
attentively receptive, open in an ungrasping and self-emptying way to irruption from the deep 
PLQG´5 Can beholding resist the temptation towards representational thinking and its relation 
to the µvulgar¶ conception of time?6 Is beholding the point at which all images (of the divine, 
for example) are abandoned? Can beholding release us from the prison of our subject/object 
relation by opening up the ground zero of pure awareness, removing us from any and every 
projection of the mediating subject?7 I suggest such ambitions rely upon a rather unhelpful 
                                                          
4 Matthew 28: 20. 
5 Ibid, pp. 29-30. 
6 In What is Called Thinking? +HLGHJJHUUHIOHFWVRQ1LHW]VFKH¶VKLJKHVWKRSHWKDWPDQZLOOEHGHOLYHUHGIURP
µUHYHQJH¶,Q1LHW]VFKH¶VZarathustra WKLVUHYHQJHLVVHHQDV³WKHZLOO¶VUHYXOVLRQDJDLQVWWLPHDQGLWVµ,WZDV¶´
Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking? (New York NY: Harper and Row 1976), p. 93. 
7 The idea that the projections of the subject provide grounds for atheism has been compelling ever since 
Feuerbach made the argument. However, mystical theology has since shown that the projecting subject does not 
preclude an encounter. As Henri Duméry put LW³Consciousness is projective, because it is expressive, because 
its objective intentionality cannot fail to express itself, to project itself on various levels of representation. This 
does not mean that these representations themselves become projected upon the objective essence, or upon the 
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decontextualized and dehistoricised conception of identity that I will explore a little more later 
on. Certainly for Heidegger, the conception of time as the three-dimensional gathering of the 
facticity of the past and the projectiRQVRIWKHIXWXUHLQWRWKHµIDOOHQQHVV¶RIWKHSUHVHQWVHHPV
at odds with any notion that we could be released into the pure presence of an immanent now. 
)RU WKH WUDGLWLRQ RI KHUPHQHXWLF SKHQRPHQRORJ\ WKDW FDPH LQ WKH ZDNH RI +HLGHJJHU¶V
revolution of tweQWLHWKFHQWXU\WKRXJKWWKHUHFDQEHQRµVKRUWURXWH¶WRDQDKLVWRULFDOQRZ8 So 
we do not escape our ecstasis (our standing outside of ourself) by some kind of entry into 
silence and attention.  
Even if some µpure consciousness¶ conception of beholding was at all plausible (and I do not 
find that it is), is education not concerned more with the comprehension and explanation that 
follows apprehension or immersion? This question reflects the epistemological tensions 
emerging in the Continental hermeneutical tradition between phenomenological experience 
(Erlebnis) and hermeneutical understanding (Verstehen), while also reaching further back to 
the foundations of philosophy where Parmenides announced the unity of thinking and being. 
For now such wider perspectives will have to remain on the horizon. But the extent to which 
education should be concerned with the boundless present prior to analytical and critical 
scrutiny is a complex practical question for those involved in educational practice. Schools, 
                                                          
reality which this essence constitutes. When contemporary phenomenologists write that the thing itself becomes 
invested with anthropological predicates and becomes known through those predicates, they merely allude to the 
need to represent the object in order to grasp its intrinsic meaning with all the faculties of the incarnated 
FRQVFLRXVQHVV%XWWKH\GRQRWGHQ\WKDWWKHREMHFWWKHREMHFWLYHPHDQLQJWKH³WKLQJLWVHOI´RUGHUVGLUHFWV
rules the course of thesHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQV´/RXLV'XSUpReligious Mystery and Rational Reflection 1998, pp. 10-
11. 
8 The emphasis on history has been an important part particularly of the work of Paul Ricoeur and Hans-Georg 
Gadamer. 
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colleges, and universities could do more to encourage quiet times, pauses, reflections, and 
silences, to create spaces for attention and contemplation. Reading could draw less on basic 
literacy or conceptual familiarity and more on lectio divina. Speaking and writing could be as 
much about bearing witness as clear expression. Many schools structure silence and 
contemplation, some, like Quaker, Maharishi, and Krishnamurti schools, in quite distinctive 
ways. These schools often break up the frenetic activity of the school day with deliberate 
pauses, or longer sessions of quiet sitting or meditation. Helen Lees has provided a survey of 
the significance of silence in schools where she undertakes the task of distinguishing forms of 
silence beyond simply the absence of noise, arguing IRUµVWURQJVLOHQFH¶DVDSRVLWLYHIRUFHLQ
education, as distinct from the forced negative silences that too often structure school 
experience.9 This work could draw more upon the philosophical and theological traditions in 
which the phenomenology of silence is so richly developed.10 While it has often been noted 
that silence is not just the absence of noise,11 the notion that silence is constituted as a positive 
                                                          
9 Helen Lees, Silence in Schools (Stoke on Trent: Trentham Books, 2012) 
10 Silence has all sorts of significations within education. A phenomenology of silence within education would 
be a fascinating project: the silences of exam halls, detentions, or classes engaged in focused activities; the many 
awkward silences as tutors invite comments from seminar students upon a reading that few students may have 
read; there are those silenced by the political or social conventions and customs in societies; there are moments 
of mindfulness so popularly evoked in many schools around the country; occasional prayers and reflections 
where groups of students perform remembrance of, for example, the war dead. At a completely different level 
exist forms of silent teaching, or direct instruction, of the sort traditions in the far East are more familiar with. I 
am thinking of particularly of Zen Buddhist traditions, though Indian religious culture has some similar 
processes with such figures as Sri Ramana Maharshi or Mother Mira, for whom the enlightened state could only 
be taught though silent transmission. 
11 Max Picard The World of Silence :DVKLQJWRQ'&5HJQHU\3XE$QQ&DUDQIDµ6LOHQFHDVWKH
)RXQGDWLRQRI/HDUQLQJ¶Educational Theory, Vol. 54, No. 2, 2004, 210-230. 
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achievement by attention²that it cannot exist without attention²is less often discussed.12 
From this point of view, the call for silence in schools could be helpfully recast in terms of a 
call to attention. But it is hardly surprising that it is not, since a call to attention is generally 
conflated with the teacher's vain repetition: pay attention! 
 
Paying attention 
µ3D\DWWHQWLRQ¶these words that have become hollow prescriptions. The words in fact mean 
µSD\ DWWHQWLRQ WR WKLV¶ 6LQFH DWWHQWLRQ LV RQH PLJKW VD\ WKH JLIW WKDW NHHSV Rn giving, the 
problems for teachers arise when students do not direct attention sufficiently to the task at hand, 
RIWHQDWHFKQLFDOGHFRQWH[WXDOL]HGµSUREOHP¶WREHVROYHGZithin a prescribed and assessable 
scheme. These are not actual problems, but representations of what real problems look like. 
Hence, as John Dewey famously noted, students have the feeling that education is not living, 
but only a preparation for it. The difficulties in directing the attention of students are familiar 
to most teachers, but they suggest a failure to understand the phenomenon of attention. In 1890 
William James bemoaned the fact that philosophers had largely ignored the faculty of attention 
arguing that ³Dn education which should improve this faculty would be the education par 
excellence.´13 Simone Weil similarly argued that the central concern of pedagogy ought to be 
the development of attention. Much contemporary research continues to assume that attention 
is something to be trained14 particularly where attention is identified with concentration or 
                                                          
12 Jiddu Krishnamurti, Total Freedom (New York NY: HarperCollins, 1996). 
13 William James, The Principles of Psychology: Volume One (Dover Publications, 1890), chapter 11. 
14 See, for example, Antoine Lotz, Heleen Slagter, Nancy Rawlings, Andrew Francis, Lawrence Greischar, 
5LFKDUG'DYLGVRQµMental Training Enhances Attentional Stability: Neural and Behavioral Evidence¶The 
Journal of Neuroscience, 21 October 2009, Vol 29, No. 42 pp. 13418-13427. 
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mindfulness. But this, as Masschelein and Simons have recently noted, seems to confuse 
attention with therapy.15 James recognised that although improving attention might be 
desirable, it is not necessarily practical: 
it is easier to define this ideal [of improving attention] than to give practical directions 
for bringing it about. The only general pedagogic maxim bearing on attention is that 
the more interest the child has in advance in the subject, the better he will attend. Induct 
him therefore in such a way as to knit each new thing on to some acquisition already 
there; and if possible awaken curiosity, so that the new thing shall seem to come as an 
answer, or part of an answer, to a question pre-existing in his mind.16 
With a similar structure in mind, Dewey accounts for the distinctive aspects of agency in 
relation to attention by distinguishing involuntary attention (characteristic of children up to the 
age of 7) with voluntary attention (which is directed at some particular, often abstracted, end) 
and reflective attention (where the goal is not just an abstracted end, but is an answer to a 
particular question within the learner).17 This reflective moment characterises progressive 
education¶s interest in letting the student answer their own question, a concept which strongly 
UHVRQDWHVZLWK+HLGHJJHU¶s educational ideal RIµletting learn.¶18 These are helpful distinctions 
to make, but they do not ultimately answer the question of origins, the fundamental etiology of 
curiosity or attention. More specifically, James indicates the problem that there are no methods 
to bring about curiosity or attention, and that this practical problem is not easily solved. The 
                                                          
15 Jan Masschelein and Maarten Simons, In Defence of School: A Public Issue. Available online: 
http://ppw.kuleuven.be/ecs/les/in-defence-of-the-school/masschelein-maarten-simons-in-defence-of-the.html 
16 Ibid. 9. 
17 John Dewey "The Development of Attention". Chapter 7 in The School and Society. Chicago: University of 
Chicago, 1915), pp. 141-152. 
18 Ibid. 4. 
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practical issue is surely related to the theoretical problem of radical origins. These practical and 
theoretical considerations are often obscured by the assumption that attention is the sine qua 
non of education. If contemporary educational thinking considers the wider role of attention in 
education, it tends to be concerned with deficits of attention and the attendant problems of 
GLDJQRVLVDQGWUHDWPHQW7KLVµGHILFLWPRGHO¶ of attention assumes an unverifiable norm: that 
students are able to direct, control, and manage attention. As such, attention is the tacit ground 
of education, something we assume to be available if not always present. From this perspective 
it seems self-evident that teachers are able to command students to pay attention. And, of 
course, in the everyday sense of the word, this is true. Teachers do expect students to pay 
attention or concentrate, and educators have a range of strategies to manage the attention of 
their students. But there are at least two philosophical problems with this idea.  
Firstly, as has already been noted, attention is always already present. From a 
phenomenological perspective, human identity can be interpreted as effectively constituted by 
attention. +HLGHJJHU¶VQRWLRQRIFDUH (Sorge) entails the gathering of attention, a gathering that 
Dasein cannot avoid since it constitutes the thereness of Dasein. From this perspective it is not 
the case that the student fails to pay attention, but rather that the attention is gathered (or 
scattered) elsewhere. It is important to observe that attention is never absent, although it might 
be otherwise engaged.19 This is an important point but I will discuss a second related problem 
in more detail.  
There is something about attention that cannot be demanded, still less coerced. Meditative 
practice amply demonstrates that attention is capable of involuntary wandering as much as 
                                                          
19 This is reminiscent to the Augustinian idea that our love for God is never absent rather it is misdirected. The 
connection with education is developed in James Smith Desiring the Kingdom: Worship, Worldview, and 
Cultural Formation (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2009). 
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voluntary control. Our attention is caught by the cry of the infant, by the beauty of the melody, 
the glance of the beloved, or by the pain when we stub a toe. Advertisers expend vast resources 
ZLWKLQWKHµDWWHQWLRQHFRQRP\¶20 seeking effective means for capturing and trading on attention. 
Of course we can resist corporate efforts to manipulate attention, but very often we follow our 
attention, not the other way around.21 Dewey offers an interesting account of the transition 
from involuntary to voluntary control of attention. Although 'HZH\¶VGHYHORSPHQWDODFFRXQW
of education moving from the involuntary to the voluntary (at around age 7) is somewhat 
helpful, it does not engage the question of agency in philosophical terms and seems too 
straightforwardly developmental to do so.22 
In the classroom, the autonomy of attention is similarly porous: the student is not simply 
commanding their attention, but often following it. The will of the student can, no doubt, 
intervene to direct matters and here we might say that the student can choose whether to offer 
the teacher their attention. Yet the skill of teaching is significantly defined as the art of engaging 
attention, a skill which cannot be reduced to a managed competency or teaching standard.  
The gathering of attention is perhaps the essence of education and what Heidegger¶VSHGDJRJ\
is really all about (whether as Sorge or Denken). Some of +HLGHJJHU¶VZULWLQJVRQSRHWU\, for 
                                                          
20 Thomas Davenport, and John Beck, The Attention Economy: Understanding the New Currency of  
Business. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2001). 
21 The recent critical theory of Bernard Stiegler understands the marketization of attention as a kind of 
proletarianisation of the consumer. This is basically because the kinds of passive attention encouraged by the 
proliferation of digital cultures, short circuit the active and critical aspects of attention. For Stiegler this is an 
existential threat partly because it corrodes the capacity of judgement that allows for a fuller sense of agency to 
resist this proletarianisation. See Bernard Stiegler For a New Critique of Political Economy, translated by 
Daniel Ross, (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2010). 
22 Dewey ³7KH'HYHORSPHQWRI$WWHQWLRQ´ 
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example, are studies in pedagogy in that they demonstrate the process of thinking the difference 
between being and representation. In the opening page of his book on +|OGHUOLQ¶V hymn Der 
Ister Heidegger says, 
We must first become attentive to this poetry. Once we have become attentive, we can 
WKHQ³SD\DWWHQWLRQWR´WKDWLVUHWDLQVRPHWKLQJVWKDW, at favourable moments, will 
SHUKDSVOHWXV³DWWHQGWR´WKDWLVKDYHVRPHLQWLPDWLRQRIZKDWmight be said in the 
word of this poet.23 
To discover what is said in the word of the poet seems to require a double-movement of 
attention, hence the circuitous, or paradoxical, manner in which attention is possible only after 
we have become attentive. An orientation of attentiveness (which is not directly controlled by 
the will) is the precondition of paying attention as an action of will. But even this second 
moment of paying DWWHQWLRQLQYROYHVDµOHWWLQJ¶ZKLFKXQGHUPLQHV the notion of a clear agent 
engaged in straightforward action. Heidegger goes on to reflect on the nature of interpreting 
poetry. Why is poetry in need of interpretation? Does interpretation help us behold the poetic 
word, or does it merely mediate and represent? Are we transported into the dwelling place of 
the poetic, or is the poetic word translated and domesticated into the digestable curricula and 
schemes of work appropriate to educational outcomes? HeideJJHULVDPELYDOHQW³$WWKHULVN
of missing the truth of +|OGHUOLQ¶V poetry, the remarks merely provide a few markers, signs 
that call our attention, pauses for reflection.´24 7KLV LV +HLGHJJHU¶V SHGDJRJ\ WR be an 
accompaniment that draws attention through markers and signs, to open spaces for reflection. 
Any other more directive or explicative move would not teach through a kind of bearing 
witness, but would represent and thereby deface or replace.  
                                                          
23 Martin Heidegger, +|OGHUOLQ¶V+\PQµ7KH,VWHU¶ (Indiana University Press, 1996), p. 1. 
24 Ibid. p. 2. 
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+HLGHJJHU¶V SHGDJRJ\ LV FKDUDFWHULVHG Ds a kind of gathering of attention that acts in a 
participative way. This is quite different to the concentration or trained mindfulness that is 
sometimes associated with attention (mindfulness in schools, for example, being a very 
fashionable topic right now). 25 More specifically, this raises questions of identity: who is in 
control and who is responsible? Very often the question of identity is problematically structured 
by a polarised conception of agency as either simply active or passive. Elsewhere I have argued 
that the obsolete linguistic mode of the middle voice reflects a mode of being which is some 
way between activity and passivity, and that this mode of being has been unable to resist the 
sedimentation of the modern subject.26 Modern English no longer uses the form of the middle 
voice (apart, perhaps, from the equivocations of peculiarly political linguistic constructions 
whereby responsibility can be acknowledged to a point: e. g.  ³PLVWDNHVZHUHPDGH´reflecting 
the fact that our modern conception of subjectivity assumes and reinforces an unequivocal 
sense of agency and responsibility. This connection between linguistic identity and subjectivity 
preoccupies much of Heidegger's later work and so we find ways to explore the relation 
between attention and the will. 
The anthropology developed by Heidegger, whether as early Dasein or later conceptions such 
as the clearing of Being, reflects the grammatical cleavage of the middle voice by locating 
                                                          
25 See for example, 7HUU\+\ODQG³On the Contemporary Applications of Mindfulness: Some Implications for 
(GXFDWLRQ´Journal of Philosophy of Education, 2015, 49, 2, pp. 170-$LVOLQQ2¶'RQQHOO³Contemplative 
Pedagogy and Mindfulness: Developing Creative Attention in an Age of Distraction´Journal of Philosophy of 
Education, 2015, 49, 2, pp. 187-'DYLG/HZLQ³Heidegger East and West: Philosophy as Educative 
Contemplation´Journal of Philosophy of Education, 2015, 49, 2, pp. 221-239. 
26 'DYLG/HZLQ³7KH0LGGOH9RLFHLQ(FNKDUWDQG0RGHUQ&RQWLQHQWDO3KLORVRSK\´Medieval Mystical 
Theology, 20:1, 2011, pp. 28-46. 
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Being and human being in the space between activity and passivity.27 Heidegger's contribution 
WRWKHKHUPHQHXWLFSURMHFWLVLQSDUWKLVFRQFHSWLRQRIµUHYHDOLQJ¶RUµGLVFORVLYHORRNLQJ¶28 in 
which agency is not to be found at the polar regions of identity, but rather in the mediate 
gathering of the middle voice. Earlier I said that this mediation is a double-movement of 
attention, entailing a primary orientation of attentiveness that precedes and structures the 
possibility of the (secondary) act of letting attention into itself. This porous even ambiguous 
notion of agency has left Heidegger open to the criticism that he equivocates on his 
philosophical (and political) commitments; that, for example, the destiny of technological 
thinking is paradoxically both determining us, and determined by us leaving no clear statement 
of what is to be (or indeed can be) done.29 We are left without a clear method of approach to 
the problems of our age. I suggest the same equivocation would be detected were we to seek a 
stable Heideggerian conception of attention. I have tried to suggest that Heidegger's 
understanding of agency here is not incidentally related to the question of attention but centrally 
so. His philosophical movement can be interpreted as an elaboration of the nature of attention, 
whether in terms of the care structure of Dasein¶VEHLQJ-in-the-world from Being and Time, of 
thinking as thanking from What is Called Thinking? and the meditative thinking of his 
Discourse on ThinkingRUPDQDVWKHµVKHSKHUGRI%HLQJ¶ in the Letter on Humanism;30 the 
                                                          
27 Bret Davis Heidegger on the Will: On the Way to Gelassenheit (Evanston IL, Northwestern University Press, 
2007). 
28 Richard Rojcewicz, The Gods and Technology: A Reading of Heidegger (New York NY, State University of 
New York, 2006). 
29 Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (New York NY, Harper and Row, 
1977). 
30 Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking (New York NY, Harper and Row, 1970); 
Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking? (New York NY, Harper and Row, 1976); 
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complex double-movement of attention mirrors the complex double-nature of identity itself 
because attention is significantly constitutive of Dasein. 7KH WKHUHQHVV RI 'DVHLQ¶V EHLQJ
appears as the opening of being onto itself: i.e. as attention. We could take this further if we 
consider how language constitutes Being and human being. In a certain sense, all speech grants 
the world in terms of structuring our orientation to it, and so speech intimates the tripartite 
gathering of the beholding which involves Being, Dasein, and mediation (teacher).31 This is 
because speech requires a speaker, a hearer, and a world, and is therefore ³WKH clearing-
concealing advent of Being itself.´32 Speech too entails a transcendental condition, namely 
being. This path into Heidegger's thinking locates the question of attention within mainstream 
philosophical discourse. Nevertheless, it is the religious traditions that offer an equally rich 
account of the dynamics of attention to which I now turn. 
 
The Paradox of Intention 
What has been called the µparadox of intention¶33 describes the dynamics of the call for 
attention rather more simply: that we may reach a goal only by giving up the attempt to reach 
                                                          
Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (New York NY, Harper and Row, 
1977); Martin Heidegger, Being and Time A Translation of Sein and Zeit (Albany NY, State University of New 
York Press, 1996). 
31 This discussion of language is meant to include all forms and levels of language, not only speech. The point is 
perhaps clearer with the concrete example of the pedagogical role of speech, but the essential point need not 
assume a priority for the spoken word.  
32 0DUWLQ+HLGHJJHU³7KH/HWWHURQ+XPDQLVP´LQBasic Writings: Second Edition, Revised and Expanded 
(New York NY, HarperCollins, 1993), p. 230. 
33 Marvin Shaw The Paradox of Intention: Reaching the Goal by Giving Up the Attempt to Reach It (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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it or, conversely, that we may be prevented from reaching a goal by our intentional efforts to 
achieve it. Religious traditions often warn of the propensity on the part of the novice to become 
preoccupied with the observance of ritual which can be the very thing that prevents the attention 
that is central to ritual itself. This is why Christian theologians are often ambivalent about 
structured religious practices. Meister Eckhart extols the pilgrim: 
Leave place, leave time 
Avoid even image! 
Go forth without a way 
On the narrow path, 
Then you will find the desert track.34  
Here the track that the novice walks along becomes an aspect of projected will that must be 
VXEYHUWHG%XWWRµGR¶WKLVWRVHWXSRQWKLVvia negativa is always in tension with itself. This 
subversion of will can, on some readings, engage attention, since all aspects of self must be 
abandoned to what presents itself in total darkness. That this might entail the pure attention of 
a timeless moment, an escape from the temporal into the eternal is an attractive yet problematic 
idea. A typical reading of Eckhart as fundamentally neo-Platonic would see the negation of 
time and history in (FNKDUW¶V via negativa. This could be seen as a clear contrast with 
+HLGHJJHU¶V UHKDELOLWDWLRQ RI WHPSRUDOLW\ DQG KLVWRU\ Despite the important resonances 
between Eckhart and Heidegger, Caputo draws a clear distinction here in the following 
summary: 
(FNKDUW¶VDWWLWXGHWRZDUGWLPHLVLQNHHSLQJZLWKWUDGLWLRQDOP\VWLFLVPKHZLVKHVWR
see God LQDOOWKLQJVVRWKDWRQH³GD\´²in eternity²he may see all things in God. But 
                                                          
34 Quoted in Bernard McGinn, The Mystical Thought of Meister Eckhart, (New York NY: Crossroad Publishing, 
2001), p. 114. 
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for HHLGHJJHU VXFK ³P\VWLFLVP´ LV ³PHWDSK\VLFDO´ EHFDXVH LW PRYHV ZLWKLQ WKH
distinction between time and eternity.35  
But does this interpretation not see Eckhart as a rather dualistic figure, reading in Eckhart a 
valorisation of the eternal over/against the temporal? &DSXWR JRHV RQ ³LW LV SURIRXQGO\
uncharacteristic of the mystic to be concerned with the historical; it is profoundly characteristic 
of him to identify his experience as an experience of a timeless now.´36 While Caputo does go 
on to complicate this rather simplistic binary between the mystic and the philosopher, this broad 
characterization speaks to the very core of the question of attention that I am trying to address. 
Our constructions of attention often do draw upon assumptions around being fully present as a 
denial of historicity and temporality. There are subtler readings of Eckhart in which the non-
dual relation between the temporal and eternal does not appear to imply such a straightforward 
neo-Platonic negation of temporality.37 7KHTXHVWLRQRI(FNKDUW¶VQRQ-duality cannot be fully 
elaborated here but the significance for my argument should be stressed:  a view of the eternal 
over/against the temporal (in denial of the temporal) is a product of the failure to see the non-
dual naWXUH RI (FNKDUW¶V WKHRORJ\ DQG DQWKURSRORJ\.38 &RQVHTXHQWO\ +HLGHJJHU¶V WKLQNLQJ
ZKLFK,KDYHLGHQWLILHGZLWKDWWHQWLRQDQG(FNKDUW¶VSUD\HUGRQRWQHHGWREHDVRSSRVHGDV
Caputo suggests: at least the point of divergence need not be the hackneyed emphasis on the 
temporal in contrast to a mystical disavowal of the temporal in favour of the eternal. Neither 
Eckhart nor Heidegger allow us to deny the world, time or existence.  
                                                          
35 John Caputo, 7KH0\VWLFDO(OHPHQWLQ+HLGHJJHU¶V7KRXJKW (Fordham University Press, 1986), p. 226. 
36 Ibid. p. 227. 
37 See, for example, Michael Sells, Mystical Languages of Unsaying (University of Chicago Press, 1994), 
chapter 6; Joseph Milne, The Ground of Being: Foundations of Christian Mysticism (Temenos Academy, 2004).  
38 See Denys Turner, The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism (Cambridge University Press), 
chapter 6. 
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It is important to understand that a significant part of our thinking about pedagogy is structured 
by this tension between seeing attention as a negation of, or an engagement with, the temporal. 
The divergence of progressive educational traditions from traditional formal pedagogy, for 
example, could be identified with the recognition of the complexity of will and attention. This 
is because progressive educators, as we have already noted Dewey in this regard, highlight the 
VSRQWDQHRXV RUJDQLF RU µQRQ-GLUHFWLYH¶ IRUPV RI OHDUQLQJ ZKHUH WKH JRDOV, as well as the 
agency, of the educational processes are less than clear. Progressive educators tend to 
emphasise the facilitative role of the teacher in contrast to a more directive approach associated 
with traditional pedagogy. From a progressive point of view directing attention is not a 
straightforward intentional act that we can employ to the disciplined appropriation of the facts, 
or a cognitive tool at our disposal. Rather, genuine attention involves a submission of the self 
to the other which cannot be simply structured or enforced.  
I wish to now draw in the philosopher Jiddu Krishnamurti who, although explicitly and 
publically disavowing any association or affiliation with a school of thought or tradition within 
either philosophy or education, speaks from a broadly progressive educational perspective. 
.ULVKQDPXUWL FDOOV WUXWK D µSDWKOHVV ODQG¶39 echoing the paradox of intention at the heart of 
pedagogy. There are no paths, ways, or hows, when it comes to the matter of attention, since 
attention is pure act. Indeed, the desire to focus attention is peculiarly susceptible to the 
delusions of intention since what we think we are harQHVVLQJZKHQZHµIRFXVWKHPLQG¶FDQ
itself be a representational or analytical construction that inhibits the freedom of total attention. 
Of course, this difficulty pertains to meditation more generally. We project our intention to 
achieve a goal which results not in the goal itself, but in the image or projection of the idealized 
                                                          
39 Jiddu Krishnamurti, Total Freedom (New York NY, HarperCollins, 1996), p. 257. 
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JRDO7KHGDQJHUKHUHLVWKDWZHLQDGYHUWHQWO\GLVSODFHRUH[WLQJXLVKWKHµIODPHRIDWWHQWLRQ¶
Krishnamurti has much to say about the significance of attention in education:  
Learning in the true sense of the word is possible only in that state of attention, in which 
there is no outer or inner compulsion. . . . It is attention that allows silence to come upon 
the mind, which is the opening of the door to creation . . . How is the state of attention 
to be brought about? It cannot be cultivated through persuasion, compari- son, reward 
or punishment, all of which are forms of coercion. . . . You can teach concentration, but 
attention cannot be taught . . . attention arises spontaneously when around the student 
there is an atmosphere of well-being, when he has the feeling of being secure, of being 
at ease, and is aware of the disinterested action that comes with love.40  
In my experience41 Krishnamurti schools generally do endeavor to create this atmosphere of 
wellbeing in which students can feel at ease. But here Krishnamurti seems to set up a structure 
in which attention leads to silence, a silence which then opens up to creation (we must be 
careful not to fall into the temptation to construct a system out of an approach that is very 
clearly antagonistic to the pervasive tendency to structure what can only be beheld). This is 
interesting to educators because the process of engaging the attention is ultimately concerned 
not with silence for its own sake, but contact with, and contemplation of, the other. If we can 
speak of the goal of attention then surely it must be related to the idea of being taken up by 
what Krishnamurti± rather oddly given his antipathy towards doctrinal religiosity ± here calls 
                                                          
40 Jiddu Krishnamurti Life Ahead: On Learning and the Search for Meaning (Novata, CA, New  
World Library, 1963), pp. 13-14. 
41 I spent 2 years living and working at Brockwood Park School, the only Krishnamurti school in the UK. I have 
also visited a number of Krishnamurti schools in India, as well as Oak Grove, the Krishnamurti school in 
California. For many years Brockwood Park has committed all staff and students to a morning meeting which 
usually, though not always, would involve sitting quietly for 15 minutes. 
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creation. Perhaps Krishnamurti intends something like the hermeneutic structure of disclosive 
looking or world disclosure that is, as I suggested earlier, an expression of beholding.  
There is a common sense view of this attention in which awareness is fully present to itself in 
DQDKLVWRULFDODQGJURXQGOHVVZD\,QVSHDNLQJRIµEHKROG¶LWLVWHPSWLQJWRWKLQNRIDWWHQWLRQ
as a kind of ground zero, a Cartesian or Archimedean point from which the world emanates. 
This disclosure is in danger of being framed as some sort of ahistorical singularity along the 
OLQHVRIDQRWKHUPRUHPRGHUQ(FNKDUW(FNKDUW7ROOHZKRVSHDNVRIWKHµSRZHURIQRZ¶7KHUH
is a range of other problems introduced when we consider the field of attentional research 
within the psychological sciences which begin with the metaphor of attention as a spotlight 
which casts the light of awareness and thereby illuminates the world.42 The spotlight model is 
prone to assume a subject/object binary. How are we to avoid this idolatry of attention in a 
moment of pure awareness, or the nowness of the now?43 .ULVKQDPXUWL¶V IRFXV RQ WKH
µFKRLFHOHVVDZDUHQHVV¶RISXUHDWWHQWLRQZKLFKLVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKZKDWKHKDVFDOOHGWKHµHQGLQJ
of tLPH¶DQGµWRWDOIUHHGRP¶44 do not seem to help. They appear to arise out of just such a naïve 
ahistorical attitude in which all conditioning falls away and we see not shadows or reflections 
(Krishnamurti often speaks of how our conditioning leads us to see only images), but we behold 
what is. It would requirHDQRWKHUHVVD\WRH[SORUHKRZ.ULVKQDPXUWL¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIDWWHQWLRQ
avoids the naiveté of assuming we should escape our historicality. In essence his concern is to 
perceive human conditioning itself thereby achieving something of a freedom in relation to it, 
                                                          
42 &KDUOHV(ULNVHQ	-DPHV6W-DPHVµ9LVXDODWWHQWLRQZLWKLQDQGDURXQGWKHILHOGRIIRFDODWWHQWLRQ$]RRP
lens model¶Perception & Psychophysics 40 (4), 1986, pp. 225±240 
43 Heidegger ecstasies of temporality offer one option here. 
44 Jiddu Krishnamurti, Total Freedom (New York NY, HarperCollins, 1996); The Ending of Time (New York 
NY, HarperCollins, 1985).  
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rather than seeking to escape entirely conditioning itself, but this is a delicate issue which is 
beyond the scope of the present article.  
There are other conceptions of attention that would move us away from a µQDWXUDODWWLWXGH¶WKDW
sees attention in these foundationalist terms - and I use the term µfoundationalLVP¶ here to echo 
the tradition of Cartesian foundationalism that might seek the cogito in a moment of pure 
attention where the self, and nothing but the self, is evident to itself. The tradition of 
phenomenological hermeneutics, offers a range of different but related conceptions of attention 
as always already constituted and formed through historical, social and psychological contexts. 
As I tried to show earlier, accounts of being-in-the-world are explicitly engaged with the 
temporality and historicity of existence. +HLGHJJHU¶V HFVWDVLHV RI WHPSRUDOLW\ DUH FOHDUO\
significant in avoiding a vulgar concept of time. More recently, Bernard Stiegler has wanted to 
include our technological apparatus into the constitution of attention, suggesting that the short 
route to self-awareness (by way of some self-certifying Cartesian foundationalism) is 
misconceived.45 For Stiegler attention itself is historically contingent, dependent upon the 
evolutionary story of human emergence.  
We have seen that there is a problem with suggesting that the will can directly command 
attention. Elements of the continental philosophical tradition, of Christian mysticism, and of 
progressive education have been somewhat helpful in sketching out a conception of will that 
undercuts some of the difficulties here. I now want to turn to some other ways in which 
educators understand attention beyond the deficit model. 
Intended Attention 
                                                          
45 Bernard Stiegler, Taking Care of Youth and the Generations (Stanford CA, Stanford University Press, 2010), 
p. 18. 
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Over recent years, mindfulness techniques have become increasingly appealing to educators. 
0LQGIXOQHVV LQ VFKRROV SURMHFWV VXFK DV µE¶ DQG WKH UHVHDUFK XQGHUWDNHQ E\ WKH 2[IRUG
Mindfulness Centre have responded to a recognition that too narrow a conception of education 
cannot be healthy. In part because the movement of mindfulness generally presents itself as 
religiously and ideologically neutral, it has been the natural partner for broadly secular, public 
institutions like schools. Perhaps mindfulness is believed to remedy the social ills that were 
once more widely treated (or suppressed) by institutional religions. But the range of differing 
techniques, philosophies, and attitudes that are placed under the banner of mindfulness should 
give us pause. The sense that a specific mindfulness practice can be employed to address 
individual and social ills such as stress or social instability, or that it might enhance creativity 
or generally provide a sense of fulfilment, should be questioned not least for appearing 
reductive or utilitarian.46 But equally problematic is the idea that mindfulness practice is within 
the direct compass of the will. For Ross, it is this intentional aspect of mindfulness that places 
it apart from beholding.47 If the emergent discourse of secularized mindfulness is incomplete, 
what can our religious traditions offer instead? This is not an easy question to answer, but I 
offer some suggestive remarks. 
In De Magistro AXJXVWLQHVD\VWKDW WKHVWXGHQWµis taught not by words, but by the realities 
themselves made manifest to him directly by God revealing them to his inner self.¶48 
Augustine's Platonic disposition seems evident in his conception of education as a form of 
bearing witness. The idea that teaching is bearing witness and learning is beholding would sit 
well with an Augustinian pedagogy. The emphasis shifts between these understandings: 
                                                          
46 Max Picard The World of Silence, pp. 2-3. 
47 Maggie Ross, µ%HKROG1RWWKH&ORXGRI([SHULHQFH¶S 
48 6W$XJXVWLQH³2QWKH7HDFKHU´Augustine: Earlier Writings, Library of Christian Classics (Philadelphia, PA: 
Westminster John Knox, 1979), 40. 
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bearing witness emphasises the role of the teacher, while beholding places the student (along 
with creation) centre stage. More broadly, the Christian mystical tradition associates silence 
and contemplation with a relinquishment of self more widely relevant to education. Evelyn 
Underhill who articulates the threefold pattern of prayer as recollection, quietude, and union,49 
PDNHV WKH FRQQHFWLRQ EHWZHHQ SHGDJRJ\ DQG HGXFDWLRQ TXLWH H[SOLFLW µIt is the object of 
contemplative prayer, as it is the object of all education, to discipline and develop certain 
growing faculties.¶50 From this perspective, the religious subject undergoes a transition from 
their activity and concentrated efforts in recollection, to a mode of relinquishing that activity 
and submission of the self to the darkness, or emptiness of God in quietude. The transition from 
the concentrated power of recollection to the submissive attention of quietude entails the 
relinquishment of the self as subjective agent. 
This tradition (or range of traditions) has often sought to educate the novice into the recognition 
of his ultimate impotence before God. Yet the subject must take that step along the path to 
relinquish the path. The Christian mystical tradition, from Augustine to Eckhart and beyond, 
has suggested something like a structure in which the religious subject comes to know God 
through a process of apophaticism.51 Turner shows that the dynamics of apophatics should be 
applied both to God and the religious subject: that there is a correlation between negation of 
God and the negation of self. At the end of the via negativa, are we left with nothing? Yes and 
no. What is left in the contemplative desert of the mind is nothing human made: nothing but 
God who is nothing. In other words, in attention we become nothing. As Simone Weil puts it, 
µ2QFHZHKDYHXQGHUVWRRGZHDUHQRWKLQJWKHREMHFWRIDOORXUHIIRUWVLVWREHFRPHQRWKLQJ.¶52 
                                                          
49 Evelyn Underhill, Mysticism: Third Edition (Mineola NY, Dover Publications, 2012). 
50 Ibid. p, 310. 
51 Turner, The Darkness of God. 
52 Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace (London, Ark, 1987), p. 30. 
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And for Weil those efforts must be attentive and prD\HUIXOVLQFHDVVKHSXWVLWµDEVROXWHO\
unmixed attention is prayer.¶53 But are we not, then, back to the problem of conceiving attention 
as an ahistorical singularity. Can becoming nothing take account of who we are in our 
historicity?  
As discussed earlier, for Eckhart the eternity of time does not negate its temporality but 
divinises it because the eternal is the ground of time itself. Despite his Augustinian and 
Neoplatonic inheritance, for Eckhart, time rests in eternity rather than being a realm to escape 
from. We do not escape history in eternity but rather find the eternal as the ground of history 
itself. It would, perhaps, be stretching things too far to relate this idea too directly with 
HeideggeU¶V FRQFHUQ WR DZDNHQ Dasein to temporality, but it need not be read as wholly 
inconsistent with it as Caputo tends to do.54 So rather than understand the eternal in terms of 
the temporal (the eternal now being understood as a supreme and enduring form of a moment 
in time), we should seek to understand the temporal in terms of the eternal. 
 
Conclusion 
The task of pedagogy is to call attention to the world, and thereby to attention itself. Attention 
may well be a contemplative activity at its core. In essence attention involves looking at²or 
better, being with²the other, whether that other is some aspect of the world calling to be borne 
in mind, the student, or God. It has been tempting to speak of this attention as involving a self-
emptying or self-negation. In this moment of pure consciousness we might imagine that the 
                                                          
53 Simone Weil, Waiting on God (London, Fontana, 1959), p. 106. 
54 John Caputo, 7KH0\VWLFDO(OHPHQWLQ+HLGHJJHU¶V7KRXJKW (Fordham University Press, 1986) pp. 216-217; 
pp. 225-226. 
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historical and temporal self must be denied so that our eternal identity can be realised. The 
dualistic framing of this elevation is redolent of neo-Platonism. Practically speaking, such 
negations of self often become the object of attention and lead, paradoxically, to inattention, 
and religious traditions have their own strategies to deconstruct the idolatries and misconstruals 
implicit in spiritual ascent. In the end it has been easier to negate popular constructions of 
attention than offer a clear alternative view. This may be because this chapter is concerned 
more with drawing attention that encourages encounter, than with offering explanation. 
